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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
  • 新疆生产建设兵团
  • شىنجاڭ ئىشلەپچىقىرىش قۇرۇلۇش بىڭتۇەنى‎‎‎
National Emblem of the People's Republic of China
Active1954 – present
Country People's Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party
TypeState-owned enterprise
Paramilitary organisation
Size2.6 million
Headquarters and area servedÜrümqi & Xinjiang
Nickname(s)XPCC
Bingtuan ("The Corps")
Divisions14
Websitewww.xjbt.gov.cn Edit this at Wikidata
Commanders
First Political CommissarMa Xingrui
Political Commissar and Party SecretaryHe Zhongyou
CommanderXue Bin
Notable
commanders		Tao Zhiyue[1]
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Chinese name
Simplified Chinese新疆生产建设兵团
Traditional Chinese新疆生產建設兵團
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinChinese: 新疆生产建设兵团; pinyin: Xīnjiāng Shēngchǎn Jiànshè Bīngtuán
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese新疆兵团
Traditional Chinese新疆兵團
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXīnjiāng Bīngtuán
Second alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese兵团
Traditional Chinese兵團
Literal meaningThe Corps
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinBīngtuán
China Xinjian Group
Simplified Chinese中国新建集团
Traditional Chinese中國新建集團
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Xīnjiàn Jítuán
Uyghur name
Uyghurشىنجاڭ ئىشلەپچىقىرىش قۇرۇلۇش بىڭتۇەنى‎‎
Transcriptions
Latin YëziqiShinjang Ishlepchiqirish Qurulush Bingtueni
Part of a series on the
History of Xinjiang
Ancient period
Medieval and early modern period
Modern period
12th company, 150th regiment, 8th division, Xinjiang production and Construction Corps

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC; 新疆生产建设兵团; 新疆兵团), also known as Bingtuan ("The Corps"), trading with the external name China Xinjiang Group,[2] is a state-owned enterprise and paramilitary organization in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The XPCC was established in 1954 under the orders of Mao Zedong, and developed sparsely populated areas in its early decades, taking the model of the traditional tuntian system of setting military units in frontier areas. The XPCC was severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, and was outright abolished in 1975, before being re-established in 1981, partly due to the Soviet-Afghan War. It re-established its economic dominance over Xinjiang afterwards, also being responsible for maintenance against the "three evils" (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism). In its history, the XPCC has built farms, towns, and cities, provided land and employment to disbanded military units, and re-settled Han migrants from other parts of China in what has been called a campaign of assimilation.

The XPCC operates cities, where it provides prisons, healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education, and has stakes in numerous publicly traded companies. It is extensively involved in economic, political and military affairs of Xinjiang, being called a "state in a state".[3][4] It is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xinjiang Committee secretary, currently Ma Xingrui, though the CCP secretary of the XPCC handles the daily affairs of the organization.[citation needed]

History

[edit]
See also: Migration to Xinjiang

The XPCC draws from the traditional Chinese tuntian system, a policy of settling military units in frontier areas so that they become self-sufficient in food, and similar policies in the Tang and Qing dynasties.[5] Construction corps were set up for sparsely populated frontier regions, including Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

After the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces deployed into Xinjiang were commanded to start production in the area. In 1953, PLA there were separated into National Defense and Production Divisions. XPCC was formed from soldiers from First Field Army, Kuomintang,[5] and from the local Ili National Army.[6]

In October 1954 the Production Division was ordered by the Mao Zedong to form People's Liberation Army Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, tasked to "Integrate labor with violent, colonize and populate the frontier" in 1954.[7][1][8] XPCC was founded by Wang Zhen. It initially comprised 175,000 military personnel, led by Tao Zhiyue as its first commander.[6]

XPCC was initially focused on settling, cultivating, and developing sparsely populated areas, such as the fringes of the Taklamakan Desert and the Gurbantünggüt Desert, under the principle of "not competing for benefits with the local people".[9] It provided a reserve military force, although they were not called upon.[6][5] XPCC was expanded by youth from other parts of China, to equalize its sex ratio and include members with better education. In 1962, after the Sino-Soviet split, rioting occurred in Yining and 60,000 ethnic minorities living near the border fled to the Soviet Union. The Chinese government feared that the USSR was trying to destabilize China[5] and start a war.[6] XPCC was ordered to cultivate the farms of the exiles.[6] By 1966 XPCC had a population of 1.48 million.

The XPCC was severely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 it was abolished completely. Its powers were transferred to the government of Xinjiang and regional authorities.[9] After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic movements gained force, fears of Soviet encirclement and Islamic fundamentalism led to the re-establishment of the XPCC in 1981[9] as well as the cultivation of frontier lands and economic development.[9] During the 1990s, XPCC began to contribute significantly to Xinjiang's economy, producing 40% of the region's cotton in 1997.[10] After 2008, as a result of improvements in farm mechanization, students were no longer compelled to pick the cotton crop.[11]

Starting in the 1980s, a stated task has been to prevent and break down "destructive activities of the three forces", (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism), in order to protect social stability and national unity.[7] In 2012, XPCC generated 11.1 billion yuan from the 37 settlements they control, "allowing the Corps to spread advanced culture and Chinese culture, while taking in and infusing culture of ethnic minority in Xinjiang".[7]

At the end of the 20th century, XPCC's military role was given instead to the Xinjiang Military District, a part of the current Western Theater Command that includes all of western China. XPCC military personnel are mostly reservists or militia.[citation needed]

Sanctions

[edit]

United States

[edit]
See also: Persecution of Uyghurs in China, Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and United States sanctions against China

XPCC was sanctioned by the United States in 2020, citing alleged human rights abuses. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Commissioner Nury Turkel remarked, "Now, no business can claim ignorance of China's oppression of the Uyghur people. We hope the sanctions signal to other Chinese officials that there are costs associated with taking part in the Communist Party's repression of religion. The world is watching and we know which officials and entities are responsible for the abuses against the Uyghur people."[12] Turkel added:

The XPCC is essentially a parallel government in Xinjiang and has been directly involved in implementing the surveillance, mass detention, and forced labor of Uyghurs.[13]

In July 2020, the United States announced Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on XPCC in connection with human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.[14][13][15] XPCC was alleged to run many internment camps,[16] as well as implementing the CCP's efforts to settle ethnic Han in the region.[17][15]

In December 2020, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced that XPCC-produced cotton and cotton products would be prohibited from import into the U.S. due to forced labor concerns.[18] In June 2021, the United States Department of Commerce placed XPCC on the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List.[19]

Canada

[edit]

Following the U.S. footsteps, Global Affairs Canada imposed sanctions against the XPCC in January 2021 due to human rights abuses.[20]

European Union

[edit]

In March 2021, the Council of the European Union listed the XPCC public security bureau as an entity subject to restrictive measures.[21] The reason given for this listing was that this entity is "responsible for serious human rights violations, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities".[22]

Organization and function

[edit]

The XPCC is a ministerial-level institution under the State Council and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region regional government.[23] It has administrative authority over medium-sized cities, settlements and farms in Xinjiang. It provides services such as healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education. Nominally subject to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, its internal affairs, including city and reclaimed land administration, are separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government. The XPCC has been described to operate as a "state within a state"[24][25][26] and has been considered by scholars as acting as a de facto prefecture-level governmental entity.[26]

The XPCC's internal affairs, including the administration of its cities and reclaimed land, is separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government.[27] It has sub-provincial powers on par with sub-provincial cities. The XPCC is headed by the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang, who is "executive political commissar" ex officio. The XPCC's own party secretary, usually a ministerial-level official,[23] typically concurrently serves as its political commissar and acts as its highest day-to-day authority, and is considered to be the second most-powerful person in Xinjiang after the CCP secretary.[28] Additionally XPCC has a commander, usually a deputy-ministerial level official.[23]

Headquartered in Ürümqi, XPCC is subdivided into divisions, then regiments. Each XPCC division corresponds to a prefecture-level administrative division, and are in themselves of sub-prefectural rank. In addition to regiments, the XPCC also administers regiment-level farms and ranches. XPCC and each individual division are headed by three leaders: a first political commissar, a political commissar, and a commander. The first political commissars of each XPCC division are their committee secretaries.[citation needed]

Administrative structure

[edit]

The XPCC's 14 divisions which are then subdivided into 185 regiment-level entities (including regiments, farms, and ranches), scattered throughout Xinjiang, mostly in previously unpopulated or sparsely populated areas.

The divisions are:

Name Founded Location (approximate) Headquarters
1st Division 1953 Aksu Prefecture Aral
2nd Division 1953 Bayingolin Autonomous Prefecture Tiemenguan
3rd Division 1966 Kashgar Prefecture Tumxuk
4th Division 1953 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture
(southern, directly administered portion)		 Kokdala
5th Division 1953 Bortala Autonomous Prefecture Shuanghe
6th Division 1953 Changji Autonomous Prefecture Wujiaqu
7th Division 1953 Ili Autonomous Prefecture
and Karamay		 Huyanghe
8th Division 1953 area east of Karamay Shihezi
9th Division 1962 Tacheng Prefecture Emin County
10th Division 1959 Altay Prefecture Beitun
11th Division
the former Construction Division		 1953 Ürümqi Xinshi, Ürümqi
12th Division 1982 Ürümqi Ürümqi
13th Division 1982 Hami Hami
14th Division 1982 Hotan Prefecture Kunyu

In May 1953, the PLA's 25th, 26th and 27th Divisions from the 9th Corps were reorganized as 7th, 8th and 9th Agriculture Construction Division of the XPCC, respectively.[citation needed]

Settlements

[edit]

The XPCC has settled Han in Xinjiang[29] and has built eleven medium-sized cities during its history, and now controls ten of them.[30] The governments of these cities are combined entirely with the division that controls them. For example, the division headquarters is the same entity as the city government, the division political commissar the same person as the city committee secretary, the division commander the same person as the city's mayor, and so forth. Ten XPCC-administered cities are nominally listed as "sub-prefectural-level cities" of Xinjiang, but the local government is usually not involved in the administration of these cities.

Name Dates of official
designation as a "city"		 Governing period Division
Kuytun[6] 奎屯市 August 29, 1975 1953–1975 7th
↳ Tianbei New Area 天北新区 - 2002–2019
Shihezi[9] 石河子市 January 2, 1976 1953–1975, 1980–present 8th
Aral 阿拉尔市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 1st
Wujiaqu[9] 五家渠市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 6th
Tumxuk 图木舒克市 January 19, 2004 1966–1975, 1980–present 3rd
Beitun 北屯市 November 28, 2011 2002–present 10th
Tiemenguan 铁门关市 December 30, 2012 2002–present 2nd
Shuanghe 双河市 February 26, 2014 2002–present 5th
Kokdala 可克达拉市 March 18, 2015 2003–present 4th
Kunyu 昆玉市 January 20, 2016 2003–present 14th
Huyanghe 胡杨河市 December 6, 2019 2010–present 7th
Xinxing 新星市 February 4, 2021 2010–present 13th
Baiyang 白杨市 January 20, 2023 2010–present 9th
Beiting 北亭市 TBD 2010–present 12th

Demographics

[edit]

XPCC is predominantly composed of Chinese citizens of Han ethnicity.[23] While the Han are by far the largest group of XPCC workers, their relative numbers have declined: from 1980 to 1993 the overall population remained constant, while Han membership declined slightly from 90% to 88%.[5]

Ethnic groups in XPCC, 2002 estimate[31]
Nationality Population Percentage
Han 2,204,500 88.1
Uyghur 165,000 6.6
Hui 64,700 2.6
Kazakh 42,700 1.7
Mongol 6,200 0.3
Others 18,100 0.7

Economic activity

[edit]

XPCC created many publicly traded subsidiary companies.[32] XPCC uses the name "China Xinjian Group" for its economic activities.[9] XPCC plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy, with the organization producing CN¥350 billion (US$52 billion), or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was CN¥98,748 (US$14,680).[33][non-primary source needed] The area and population of the XPCC are generally given as part of Xinjiang's total figures, but XPCC's GDP is generally reported separately.[34]

XPCC's primary economic activity remains agriculture, including cotton, fruit, vegetables, food crops, vegetable oils, and sugar beets. Important products are cotton, tomatoes, ketchup, Korla pears, Turpan grapes, and wine. In 2018 the XPCC produced 30% of China's cotton output.[26] XPCC has a mix of factory farming and smaller farms. XPCC dominates Xinjiang's agriculture and controls nearly a quarter of Xinjiang's arable land.[30][35] During its history, XPCC established significant mining and mining-related industries, most of which subsequently were handed over to the Xinjiang government. XPCC is also involved in tertiary industries, including trade, distribution, real estate, tourism, construction and insurance.[30]

Subsidiaries

[edit]

The XPCC has thousands of subsidiary companies. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies has identified 2,923 subsidiaries.[36] Currently the XPCC has eleven publicly traded subsidiaries.[citation needed] They are:

Education and media

[edit]

XPCC operates its own educational system covering primary, secondary and tertiary education (including two universities, Shihezi University (石河子大学) and Tarim University (塔里木大学)); its own daily newspaper, Bingtuan Daily; and its own TV stations at both provincial and division levels.[citation needed]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b "Tao Zhiyue 1892 - 1988)" in James Z. Gao: Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949), p. 358, 2009, Scarecrow Press
  2. ^ "Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps". China Internet Information Center. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 31 October 2010.
  3. ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (26 July 2022). "Xinjiang paramilitary group plays "critical role" in Uyghur repression, report finds". Axios. Retrieved 27 July 2022.
  4. ^ Murphy, Laura T.; Elimä, Nyrola; Tobin, David (July 2022). "Until Nothing Is Left: China's Settler Corporation and its Human Rights Violations in the Uyghur Region. A Report on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps". Helena Kennedy Centre. Sheffield Hallam University. Archived from the original on 27 July 2022. Retrieved 26 July 2022.
  5. ^ a b c d e Rossabi, Morris (2005). Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers. University of Washington Press. pp. 157–158.
  6. ^ a b c d e f O'Neill, Mark (13 April 2008). "The Conqueror of China's Wild West". Asia Sentinel. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 22 April 2011.
  7. ^ a b c 康小兰, ed. (5 October 2014). "新疆生产建设兵团的历史与发展". State Council Information Office. Archived from the original on 20 March 2017. Retrieved 12 October 2014.
  8. ^ Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps: Key Policy Tool from Mao to Xi Archived 27 August 2020 at the Wayback Machine Andrew Erickson, 16 November 2019
  9. ^ a b c d e f g "IX. Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps". History and Development of Xinjiang. State Council of the People's Republic of China. May 2003. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 31 October 2010.
  10. ^ Becqelin, Nicolas (July 2000). "Xinjiang in the Nineties". The China Journal. 44 (44). University of Chicago Press: 65–90. doi:10.2307/2667477. JSTOR 2667477. S2CID 144549708.
  11. ^ Douclose, Eva (22 August 2020). "Sanctions on China's top cotton supplier weave a tangled web for fashion brands". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 22 August 2020. Retrieved 23 August 2020.
  12. ^ Linda Lew (24 August 2020). "Xinjiang's sprawling conglomerate may be biggest ever to face US sanctions". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 24 August 2020. Retrieved 24 August 2020.
  13. ^ a b Lipes, Joshua (31 July 2020). "US Sanctions Key Paramilitary Group, Officials Over Abuses in China's Xinjiang Region". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 31 July 2020. Retrieved 31 July 2020.
  14. ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (31 July 2020). "U.S. sanctions China's paramilitary in Xinjiang". Axios. Archived from the original on 23 August 2020. Retrieved 31 July 2020.
  15. ^ a b "Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 31 July 2020. Archived from the original on 23 August 2020. Retrieved 31 July 2020.
  16. ^ "On Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers in Xinjiang, China". United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 4 August 2020. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  17. ^ "U.S. imposes sanctions on Chinese company over abuse of Uighurs". Reuters. 31 July 2020. Archived from the original on 3 August 2020. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  18. ^ Lawder, David (3 December 2020). "U.S. bans cotton imports from China producer XPCC citing Xinjiang 'slave labor'". Reuters. Archived from the original on 3 December 2020. Retrieved 3 December 2020.
  19. ^ "U.S. restricts exports to 5 Chinese firms over rights violations". Reuters. 23 June 2021. Archived from the original on 23 June 2021. Retrieved 23 June 2021.
  20. ^ "Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Committee of the Whole – Portfolio list – Briefing material". Global Affairs Canada. 10 March 2022. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023. Retrieved 30 March 2023.
  21. ^ "Statement: EU sanctions to four Chinese individuals and a Chinese entity on human rights violations; Counter-sanctions by the PRC" (PDF). European Parliament. 23 March 2021. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 June 2022. Retrieved 25 September 2022.
  22. ^ "Official Journal of the European Union, L 99 I, Vol. 64, p.12". EUR Lex Access to European Union Law. 22 March 2021. Archived from the original on 26 March 2021. Retrieved 25 September 2022.
  23. ^ a b c d "Decoding Chinese Politics". Asia Society. Retrieved 2 October 2023.
  24. ^ "The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: an Insider's Perspective". www.bsg.ox.ac.uk. Archived from the original on 16 June 2018. Retrieved 6 August 2020.
  25. ^ "US imposes sanctions on Chinese 'state-within-a-state' linked to Xinjiang abuses". The Guardian. 31 July 2020. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
  26. ^ a b c Murphy, L and Elimä, N. (2021). "In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains."  Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice
  27. ^ Bao, Yajun. "The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps" (PDF). Oxford University BSG. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 May 2020. Retrieved 19 April 2019.
  28. ^ "Dismantling China's Muslim gulag in Xinjiang is not enough". The Economist. 9 January 2020. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 19 January 2020. Retrieved 19 January 2020.
  29. ^ Ramzy, Austin; Buckley, Chris (16 November 2019). "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 22 December 2019. Retrieved 16 November 2019.
  30. ^ a b c "Many Han Chinese don't mind the gulag for their Uighur neighbours". The Economist. 9 January 2020. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 12 January 2020.
  31. ^ "Source". Archived from the original on 29 September 2007. Retrieved 2 July 2005.
  32. ^ Feng, Emily (23 May 2018). "China tightens grip on restive western region". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 20 September 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2020.
  33. ^ "新疆生产建设兵团2022年国民经济和社会发展统计公报". www.btdsys.gov.cn. 28 March 2023. Archived from the original on 22 June 2023. Retrieved 22 June 2023.
  34. ^ Olesen, Alexa (8 October 2014). "China's Vast, Strange, and Powerful Farming Militia Turns 60". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 30 December 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2020.
  35. ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (26 July 2022). "Report: Xinjiang paramilitary group has "central role" in genocide". Axios. Retrieved 22 June 2023.
  36. ^ Rajagopalan, Megha (10 August 2021). "Goods Linked To A Group That Runs Chinese Detention Camps May Be Ending Up In US Stores". Buzzfeed News. Archived from the original on 3 September 2021. Retrieved 3 September 2021.
  37. ^ "Built on Repression: PVC Building Materials' Reliance on Labor and Environmental Abuses in the Uyghur Region". Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice. 14 June 2022. Archived from the original on 23 June 2022. Retrieved 22 June 2022.

Sources

[edit]
Library resources about
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
  • Originally translated from the Chinese Wikipedia article
  • Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties." The China Journal, no. 44 (2000): 65–90.
  • Desai, Sohum, Study of the Infrastructure of Xinjiang, Security Research Review.
  • McMillen, Donald H. "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region." The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 6 (1981): 65–96.
  • O'Neill, Mark, "The Conqueror of China's Wild West" Archived 21 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine Archived 21 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Asia Sentinel, 13 April 2008.
  • For additional information, see James D. Seymour, "Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan", Inner Asia, 2, 2000, pp. 171–193.
[edit]
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