Talk:Identity (philosophy)

Split

OK, this needs to be split up. Any ideas for useful page titles? --FOo 23:01 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)

OBSCURE RELATION example Clark Kent is Superman was removed for its irrelevance to the topic. ie it was not sufficiently generic and too American for globally encompassing understanding. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.209.62.164 (talk) 19:50, 15 March 2012 (UTC)

Point Clarification

I'm curious what the point of this paragraph is:

Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.

Whatever it is, I think it would be expressed more clearly in something like this:

We sometimes say two things are identical iff they have every property except spatial location in common. This we can say "this box is identical to that one." At other times, though, we say two things are identical iff they have absolutely every property in common. If we take "identity" in this sense, it's impossible to point to two identical boxes.

Would this be a reasonable replacement, or would the replacement result in missing some more profound point? Maybe something more profound would arise, for example, if we considered non-spatial things -- because non-spatial things don't have the constraint that "they can't be in the same place at the same time".

--Ryguasu 12:48, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)

Response

I think the notion of identity in metaphysics goes deeper than that. Identity is an object's relation to itself, not merely to objects that resemble it strongly. It doesn't really make sense to say that "two objects are identical if ...", because if x and y are identical, then they are not two objects; they are two names for one object.

You mean, presumably, that "they" are a single object with two names (Be clear: are x and y the things or the names?)

What we are asking, it seems to me, is not "Are two objects interchangeable if ... ?" but rather "What is that relationship, which x has to itself, that it does not have to any object other than itself?" Or, put another way, "Given two names or descriptions x and y, by what means can we discern if they in fact name the same object?"

If you are familiar with the Lisp programming language, you might consider the difference between the predicates EQ and EQUAL. (EQUAL X Y) returns truth if the variables X and Y refer to data objects that are equivalent -- roughly, if you print them both out, they will look the same. (EQ X Y), however, returns truth only if X and Y are two names for the same data object in memory. --FOo 14:27, 9 Sep 2003 (EDT)

Response2

I would like to take Ryguasu's proposal one step further: a definition of identity should not refer to any particular property, not even spatial location: after all, we may wonder if two things we see in the same spot, but at different times, are the same. So my phrasing would be something like:

The identity of an object is its being a particular member of a given set, rather than some other member. Put in terms of traditional theory on semantics, it is the reference of a description (a predicate). For example, a description could be the owner of the bike with a broken saddle who was here yesterday; it refers to a particular person; this relationship between this description and the person we call the identity of that person. (It's a property of a term within this description, not a property of the person himself!)

This is much too confusing. Why bring in sets at all? Surely the first sentence would be better expressed by "...it's being a particular object and not any other object". That way one also doesn't raise the specter of things tat can't belong to sets, such as (arguably) properties, "proper classes" (or, as Quine called them, "ultimate classes", and vague objects, all of which haev been discussed extensively by philosophers and logicians in relation to identity. Descriptions and predicates are not quite the same. (The description you offer is not a predicate; if it began with the word is, it would be one.) And not all objects are referred to by descriptions, or at all. (First, there is the issue of substitutional versus ontic quantification. Second, there is the difference between names and descriptions.) And no, despite some careless remarks by Frege, it is generally agreed by logicians that identity is not a relation between terms, but between objects. (What you are thinking of is the fact that identity statements are informative only when expressed using two different referring expressions.)

Identity is a controversial issue in computer programming, mathematical logic, and particularly in their meeting ground, database theory. Traditional logic, and relational database theory, describes things in terms of their observable properties and relationships: reference and identity do not exist between elements of a description, but are links between the description and the world it applies to. In terms of the description, objects cannot be compared other than by comparing their observable properties. Programming languages, however, are full of references (pointers), and the issue is whether such a thing should be allowed in conceptual descriptions of the world - such as relational databases. Does it make sense to be able to state that a person's parent is identical to some other person's parent, or should we fundamentally state this relationship in terms of observable properties that we hold in the database, and by which parents can be identified? A system that supports the former is said to support object identity.

Rp 22 Nov 2003

Shared Identity

Identity has a sense in which things share An Identiy, i.e. "black", or two " black and four footed", or more "black four footed and called 'puss' ". In another sense it's scope includes cultural and phyiological filters or precepts. It is cumulative, quantitative and qualitative, it accretes, like datae or quantae. This is proximately related to categories and "forms". Taken as such we can look on socrates idea of "joints" rather clearly. Thus the aforementioned "ambiguity" is really the ambiguity of "grey" in that it can be more grey or less, more ore less identical. It is a primitive term to some philosophical systems. An identity may subsume a name, names associate with other names, systems are built. Some of the 'identiy' concepts are found in group theory, in some things it is identical but it is different in others. Thus the concepts of Definition or 'naming' by shared and/or excluded traits.

An identity/name may refer to a braod category or small. As names are added the category narrows till an idividual is represented, that is a thing is represented which by it's exclusions can only represent one thing; holding, by convention , some terms as absent ( eg time, for an a individual man). comments please.wblakesx

Move

I moved the following paragraph from metaphysics to here (it was already discussed above as, well, at least questionable):

Two objects can be called identical, meaning that they have the same shape, size and other properties. Thus, when we interchange the two objects, we do not see any difference. However, in terms of a stricter sense of identity, the initial and final situation are different. By observing not just the initial and final situation but the move itself, we can know this.

Wikipedia is an encyclopedia - so in the paragraph "Metaphysics" in the article "Identity" it should describe, what identity means in metaphysics - and there, the above paragraph makes no sense. If two descriptions of objects share all properties - well, then that's it, it's the same object they refer two. --denny vrandečić 15:31, Sep 6, 2004 (UTC)

ID

What about the most common use of the word identity, as in one's identification or proof of identity?Pedant

• see Identity document. But you're right, there should be a link - I added the link to the Identity disambiuation page. --denny vrandečić 11:47, Sep 7, 2004 (UTC)

So many identities!

In my hunt for an identity operator article, I discovered many pages relating to identity in its different contexts and meanings. Many of these pages have overlapping content, poor clarification what the word identity means in different fields, etc. Perhaps this is due to the ambiguety of the word itself, but I still feel that this could be cleaned up or better organized. Just some examples: identity, Identity (disambiguation), List of mathematical identities, Identity (mathematics), Identity element, Identity function, Identity Property of Addition. For instance, this page seems to focus on the philosophy meaning but it has sections on logic and computer programming which seems inappropriate. It seems there are two directions this page can go in:

• Remove content about identity meanings unrelated to philosophy and allow the disambig page to sort those differences out.
• Include other sections on alternate meanings of identity such as Mathematical identity (identity element and identity) with links to their respective main pages, much like the Operator article does.

Personally, I'd be in favor of the second route, but give me some input.

I prefer the first idea; most of the page is about the philosophical concept of identity. I think it should be renamed Identity (Philosophy) to be consistent with other Identity pages. Bryan 17:25, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

OK, I did it. Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

The logical aspect of identity very much does belong to philosophy. Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, all working in philosophy of logic.

Calling All Philosophers

I've done what I could to clean up this page; it needs help, now, from someone who can integrate the material (see [1]). Bryan 18:01, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Another possible merger?

How about merging this with Ship of Theseus itself? The two are quite similar.

I like having articles at places like the ship and the axe, although much of the discussion of the interpretation of those metaphors in the context of identity should be put into this article (and some should be removed from those). But the stories themselves, especially the ship, are as encyclopedic as many of Aesop's fables or [Plato's cave]]. Smmurphy^(Talk) 07:31, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

The Ship of Theseus thought experiment is important in its own right and should not merge with this article.

I agree that the Ship of Theseus should not be merged with identity, altough it is a puzzle about identity it also a puzzle about material constitution and material coincidence. --RickardV 21:10, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

Qualitative versus numerical identity

This section looks somewhat spurious to me. I assume that what should be being talked about is duplicates sharing intrinsic properties, not qualitative properties? A proper philosopher needs to fix this section up. Ben Finn 20:18, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Merger with Law of identity

This was just a thought. I think both titles should direct to the same article (or possibly one of them to a section, etc.) Gregbard 06:44, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

One is mathematics and logic, the other is philosophy and psychology. -- Craigtalbert (talk) 23:05, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps this is too anal

But "Clark Kent = Superman" is not, to my mind, an expression of mathematics.

also, the "Charlie Brown = Satan" example seems like it ought to be removed... either that or I'm missing the point.. or am woefully behind on my popular culture?... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.236.169.226 (talk) 04:40, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Identity = sameness?

In ordinary discourse, identity, sameness and equality are not at all the same (no pun intended).

Moreover, these terms have been run-together for far too long by logicians and philosophers, an issue raised here:

Saunders, S. (2006), 'Are Quantum Particles Objects?', Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62

and in more detail at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2006.htm

Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 16:46, 12 September 2008 (UTC)

The concepts have different origin. However there is a law in philosophy that states that two things sharing every attribute are not only similar, but – by definition – are the same thing. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 10:51, 6 December 2010 (UTC)

Opening paragraph

Is surely VERY weak, and personal essay like.--Philogo (talk) 01:36, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

SHARNI —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.100.108.130 (talk) 18:24, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

See also

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Baruch Spinoza, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause --- Are they that important? More important than Leibniz? None of them is mentioned in the article.

The Golden Rule, Shunyata --- certainly everything is somehow related to everything else (in philsophy), but in some cases the relation is a long-distance one. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.152.208.69 (talk) 02:26, 9 December 2010 (UTC)

Lede restored

I removed the essaylike wall of text that was added before the lede. Please _DO NOT_ restore this text as it was; we can discuss here on this article talk page what, if anything should be incorporated to the article, but the lede must be a brief, accessible precis of the article contents. Moreover, the tone of the text removed was, to my mind (and I'm willing to be convinced otherwise) not appropriate for an encyclopedia article. BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 19:41, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Well done, you have just removed text that provided any means of understanding what the article is about, and restored it (the article) effectively to a set of meaningless cited quotes! Philosophy doesn't fit well into WP policy, which, it seems, disallows interpretation, discussion of ambiguities, or giving illustrative examples! When you take all that out of a philosophy article, what are you left with? A series of small cited quotes which mean absolutely nothing! Surely, a good lede should explain what the article is about, and why we should care? Still, you know best!! For the present, I will restore the removed text below (where it will no doubt be overlooked). Stho002 (talk) 21:19, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

This is what the article is about and why you should care:

In philosophy, identity usually refers to the idea that a person or object can change over time in many ways, but still remain, in some meaningful sense, the same person or object, despite the changes. This is the idea of numerical identity over time, not to be confused with qualitative identity, which is exact similarity. A person is born as a small baby, grows up, grows old, and finally dies. The person that dies bears little similarity to the baby, so, in what sense is it "the same person"? That is the challenge for the philosopher to explain, in the case of personal identity over time. The identity of inanimate objects over time also presents certain philosophical problems, but the case of personal identity over time is the most important and challenging, for obvious reasons. Robinson (1985) discussed an interesting nonhuman case. An amoeba reproduces by symmetrical binary fission. There are now two amoebae where previously there was one ... so what has happened to the parent amoeba? Has it "died"? Does it still exist? Is it identical with one or both of the daughter amoebae? Robinson's solution is a controversial one, invoking "multiple occupancy", whereby, basically, there were two amoebae all along, fully coincident until they diverged by the fission process! Issues of identity over time, and particularly issues of personal identity over time, are linked to the theory of materialism, in the sense that the possible solutions to the identity question differ between materialist and nonmaterialist theories. Personal identity over time is also linked to four-dimensionalism, a metaphysical theory of time. An interesting question is whether personal identity over time on a materialist view implies that the orthodox view of what human beings think they are is significantly unrealistic, particularly with regard to the generally high level of importance that we give to our lives, ultimate death, and the ethics by which we live. In the book Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) famously proposed just such a view. Materialist theories of personal identity over time all have the counterintuitive consequence that there isn't a fully robust difference between my life vs. someone else's life, my death vs. someone else's death, my suffering vs. someone else's suffering, etc. Events could happen, in principle, which render it indeterminate whether a death is your death, or someone else's. For example, if a teletransporter machine was invented which took you apart, atom by atom, and beamed the information to Mars, where local atoms were assembled according to that information to create a person physically and psychologically identical to you when you stepped into the teletransporter back on Earth, and then that person was murdered, is it you who has been murdered? Should you worry about what happens to you after teletransportation, or is it not your problem? Why is it any more your problem if it happens without you first being teletransported? By contrast, the nonmaterialist can claim that it is a fundamental fact, for any real or imaginary circumstance, whether you continue to exist or not. While this idea may seem intuitively correct, the problem is that it does not appear to be possible to prove the existence of any such "fundamental fact", scientifically or even just rationally. Because of this limitation, nonmaterialism is a "dead end", both scientifically and philosophically. Analytic philosophers can only explore the consequences of various materialist theories. They do not necessarily either believe or disbelieve the materialist theories that they so explore, though there can be a very fine line between believing a theory as opposed to merely "running with it". These are some of issues at stake in the philosophy of identity.

In principle, the hypothetical teletransporter, as described above, could simultaneously beam two (or more!) copies of your information to different places, and assemble two people, both with equal claim to be you! This is analogous to the amoeba fission example (above). This presents the nonmaterialist with rather a problem, and they can only deny that such a circumstance is in any way possible, perhaps because teletransportation, of necessity, kills the original person. But it presents the materialist with no such problems, except only in deciding which alternative (materialist) theory of personal identity is the best theory to go with, theory choice being independent of any further fundamental (="robust") facts about the case. The materialist already knows all the relevant facts, we can imagine, and must merely select the best (or, at least "a good") way to express those facts in terms of personal identity. This is what philosophers of identity do. The "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), as described above for amoebae undergoing fission, could easily be extended to this case, and thus represents one materialist option, though not necessarily "the best option" (whatever that really means?) It is unclear if what philosophers of identity do is merely an "academic" exercise, or whether it could have any useful practical applications. Zelenak (2009) has attempted to link philosophy of personal identity with tax policy! Parfit (1984) had argued, in effect, that it is just as unethical to start smoking oneself, as it is to encourage someone else to start. In either case, one is putting at risk the future health of the smoker, and just because, in one case, that smoker is "your future self" doesn't make any sort of fundamental difference to the facts.

As an alternative to the "multiple occupancy" theory of Robinson (1985), Gallois (1998) proposed "occasional identity". Robinson (1985) seems to have tacitly assumed that if you allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission (see below), then there must have been two (coincident but distinct) amoebae in existence before fission. Gallois (1998) rejected this in favour of saying that there was only one amoeba before fission, but that both daughter amoebae were identical (to it and to each other) then, but not now. It is important to reiterate that both Robinson and Gallois are materialists, who don't disagree on any of the physical facts of the case, as might be given to them by a scientist who has studied the fission of amoebae. It is merely a case of which is the "better theory". Braddon-Mitchell & Miller (2004) defend the view that personal identity over time is a matter of convention, but again they are materialists trying to defend what they consider to be a "better theory". Sider (2001) suggests that "occasional identity" may conflict to some extent with preferred materialist theories of time. At any rate, it is likely that the adoption of any practical applications from personal identity theory will forever be hampered by lingering doubts over the truth of materialism, upon which everything depends. Just as it is impossible to prove that facts about personal identity are fundamental (i.e., disprove materialism), it is equally impossible to prove materialism (with absolute certainty). This would be the only risk associated with stepping into a teletransporter. If materialism is true, then no problem. If materialism is false, then the consequences of teletransportation on humans are unknown and therefore possibly seriously unpleasant. On the whole, materialists tend to be scientists, academics, and/or "materialists" in the colloquial sense, whereas nonmaterialists tend to be more "spiritually" inclined people, who place greater value on such things as emotions, love, and free will. The biggest challenge facing the materialist is to explain the phenomenon of qualia in purely physical terms. The usual response is for them to simply assume that qualia can be explained in purely physical terms somehow. In fact, qualia are the only real stumbling block for materialism. In a world without qualia, there would still be no absolute proof of materialism, but there would also be no reason or motivation to doubt materialism. Materialism would be the natural default assumption. Furthermore, the abstract possibility of nonmaterialism without qualia would be in no significant way different to materialism (by way of a very rough analogy, it would be like a world with banks but no money ... possible, but utterly pointless!)

Just by way of clarification, the only reason why Robinson (1985) needed to allow both daughter amoebae to have existed before fission, was to prevent having to say that any amoeba had ceased to exist (i.e. "died") because of the fission, so, basically, nothing died because the same two amoebae are present both before and after the fission event.

I agree with BrideOfKripkenstein that the lede must be a brief, accessible precis of the article contents, and that the "expanded lede" did not comply with that. If there are RSs for the additional material, then it belongs in the body of the text, not the lede. If necessary the lede would then by changed to remain an accessible precis. No edit wars PLEASE they are very boring and rarely improve articles. In case of dissent argue the case on the talk page. One additional request: would STHo002 please sign his comments — Philogos (talk) 21:19, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

'Brief, accessible precis of the article contents' is not possible for metaphysics! Stho002 (talk) 21:21, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

That is just an assertion: we expect arguments on this page (that is you must give reasons for what you say - if you expect them to be taken seriously.— Philogos (talk) 21:26, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

How am I supposed to demonstrate that 'Brief, accessible precis of the article contents' are not possible for metaphysics (though by philosophy standards, my lede was brief and accessible!)? Well, I can only try. Just read what I wrote in the removed lede, and then read the article without it. Which version gives you a better understanding of the issues? Besides, the article is about identity (philosophy), which is related to the concept of identity (mathematics), but the article as written places too much emphasis on the trivial aspects of the latter (gee, every object is identical with itself ... that's useful to know!) Stho002 (talk) 21:42, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Sorry I do not see how the assertion Brief, accessible precis of the article contents are not possible for metaphysics follows on the assumption that the article gives a better understanding of the issues with your lede than it does with no lede at all. Be that as it may, if you have reliable sources for the material you beleive would improve the article, then why not introduce a new paragraph or two and put it in there. The lede can be adjusted subsequently as need be.— Philogos (talk) 22:14, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

my "assertion" isn't supposed to follow from that "assumption". The "assumption" is supposed to illustrate that the article as written doesn't give the reader much of an idea what 'identity' in philosophy is all about. No, I do not have reliable sources for the explanation and illustration of points made in reliable sources! Your thinking is circular. We start with the information in a reliable source, and try to explain what it means, using examples (i.e, interpret the source). Philosophy isn't about simple facts, but about complex ideas. I repeat that the article as written is useless and pointless, because it doesn't explain (using examples) what the information is supposed to mean. No wonder students get told not to use Wikipedia! Fast track to fail ... You clearly have already learned some philosophy, so you already know to some extent what the article is supposed to be about, but imagine how the article seems to someone who doesn't already know what it is about ... Stho002 (talk) 23:47, 13 June 2011 (UTC)

Furthermore, interpreting, explaining and giving examples doesn't necessarily conflict with NOR or NPOV, and does not itself require citation of sources further to the ones one is trying to explain and interpret ... Stho002 (talk) 00:06, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

I'd just like to point our for Stho002 that the article Personal identity (philosophy) exists and may already be more like what he wants to make this article. Perhaps there should be a discussion about the continuing coexistence (or possible merger) of those two articles, what their respective domains are, and how to make that clear on each article, sending people to the other quickly if they've stumbled into the wrong place by accident? --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:37, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

thanks, I hadn't noticed that article. It doesn't really solve anything though, if anything, it just adds to the problem! That article also needs a darn good shakeup. The problem is that WP is structured in such a way as to keep separate different facets of the same issue, which doesn't really work for philosophy stuff like this. The issues of personal identity over time, identity of objects over time, identity as a general abstract concept, qualia and philosophy of mind, ethics, materialism, Cogito ergo sum, four-dimensionalism, etc. are all deeply interwoven, and you can't really write a separate article on each one without at the very least having a lede on each article that explains how it fits in with the others ... what to do? Stho002 (talk) 02:58, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

The solution is to write about each subject focusing on that one aspect of the whole-general-sort-of-mish-mash predominantly, and writing about related subjects as necessary, but no more. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:42, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

The solution is either an unrealistic goal, or it is only realistic to the extent that I was doing that. But in something as esoteric as metaphysics, there is no simple solution, so surely the main thing is whether the article actually manages to explain something, for otherwise it is a waste of space and time. Stho002 (talk) 07:46, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Stho002, Please see Wikipedia:LEDE. Your text did none of those things, I'm afraid. BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 00:11, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Well, then I must be on a completely different planet to you, my friend, because on my planet the current lede does none of those things, and gives the reader absolutely no idea what the concept of identity is philosophy is about, nor what the key issues are. Wikipedia: "so much knowledge, so little sense ..." Stho002 (talk) 00:38, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Stho002 if you have reliable sources for the material you beleive would improve the article, then why not introduce a new paragraph or two and put it in there. The lede can be adjusted subsequently as need be. Your fellow editors will then be able to evaluate an edit the new material. Please try and and speak with the quiet voice of reason: you will not get far with rhetoric for a philosophy page! - — Philogos (talk) 00:35, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

now I really get frustrated when I reply to someone's comment and they respond by making the very same comment! What I believe will improve the article does not need citations to "reliable sources". What I believe will improve the article is interpreted explanation and illustration (by way of examples) of what the existing sources are saying. Putting the stuff in proper context, not making small out of context uninterpreted quotes from sources, which is what the article currently does. This need not be seen as a contravention of NOR or NPOV, properly construed, and the alternative is bad articles like this article currently is. Philosophy (particularly metaphysics) is a very different beast to science, history, etc., and if you don't explain/interpret/illustrate then there is no meaning ... Stho002 (talk) 00:45, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Stho002 Calm down! Remember quiet voice of reason. Now I asked a question which you have not answered. Read it carefully and try again. Here it is again: if you have reliable sources for the material you believe would improve the article, then why not introduce a new paragraph or two and put it in there? The other editors objection- at this stage - is not to your material but where you have put it, i.e. in the lede. The requiremtns for a lede (introductory text thereof) are distinct. BrideOfKripkenstein directed you to the requirements. Have you read them? The other editors will just keep reverting you if you do not respect them. What a waste of time. Read this, then see if you can be a good fellow and answer my question.

Introductory text. As explained in more detail at Wikipedia:Lead section#Introductory text, all but the shortest articles should start with introductory text (the "lead"). The lead should establish significance, include mention of notable criticism or controversies, and be written in a way that makes readers want to know more. The appropriate length of the lead depends on that of the article, but should be no more than four paragraphs. The lead itself has no heading and, on pages with more than three headings, automatically appears above the table of contents, if present.

— Philogos (talk) 00:58, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Actually, I am calm ... you should see me when I get angry, the expanding green pectorals busting the buttons of my shirt off, etc.!! My frustration here is because you are telling me that I am missing the point, when I believe it is you who are missing the point (or maybe we both are?) I could not agree more that 'the lead should establish significance, include mention of notable criticism or controversies, and be written in a way that makes readers want to know more'. Absolutely! Spot on! My very point from the beginning! The current lead/lede does none of these things. Mine did. What else can I say??? Stho002 (talk) 01:08, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

You can answer my question: if you have reliable sources for the material you believe would improve the article, then why not introduce a new paragraph or two and put it in there? — Philogos (talk) 01:27, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Because: what I already wrote as a lead/lede establishes significance, include mention of notable criticisms and controversies, and is written in a way that makes readers want to know more, whereas the current lead/lede does not ... Stho002 (talk) 01:35, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Well no other editor agrees with you, so it looks like if you don't want the material anywhere than in the lede then it won't appear at all.— Philogos (talk) 01:41, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Well the other editors are demonstrably wrong! The current lead/lede reads:

'In philosophy, identity, from Latin: identitas (“sameness”), is the exact sameness of things. According to Leibniz's law two things sharing every attribute are not only similar, but are the same thing. The concept of sameness has given rise to the general concept of identity, as in personal identity and social identity.

An entity can only be fully identical with itself. Any difference gives rise to a separate identity. Thus identity is whatever makes an entity definable and recognizable, in terms of possessing a set of qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other entities.[1][2] In layman's terms, identity is whatever makes something the same or different'

Fantastic, so this article is all about the fact that a person or object is identical with itself and nothing else, or at best about what makes a person or object identical to itself. Either way, sounds like a riveting read! Stho002 (talk) 01:45, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

the discussion has been about your edit, not the current lede. If you have comments on the current lede start a new para and put them there— Philogos (talk) 01:47, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

The current lede

Hey everybody, has anybody noticed that the current lede fails rather miserably to 'establish significance, include mention of notable criticism or controversies, and be written in a way that makes readers want to know more'? Any suggestions about what can be done to remedy this?? Stho002 (talk) 01:52, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

particularly in view of the fact that this article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale! Cough...!

Stho002 (talk) 02:33, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

I don’t think the lead is that bad, let’s look at what a lead should do according to Wikipedia:LEDE. Leads should: define the topic, establish context, explain why the subject is interesting or notable, and summarize the most important points. I feel the lead both defines the topic and establishes context pretty well. It could be expanded a bit to summarize the most important points and further explain why the subject is interesting. I do not feel your suggested lede is an improvement though. There is a huge different between summarizing key points and writing a vast essay on the topic - A lede isn’t the place for an essay. JonPF (talk) 21:23, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Agree with that. Suggest lede should only mention points of interest that are outlined in the article body, or at least other linked articles. — Philogos (talk) 23:36, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

References

• Braddon-Mitchell, D.; Miller, K. 2004: How to be a conventional person. Monist, 87(4): 457-474.
• Gallois, A. 1998: Occasions of identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198237448 Google books
• Parfit, D. 1984: Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-824908-X Google books
• Robinson, D. 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? Australasian journal of philosophy, 63(3): 299–319. doi:10.1080/00048408512341901
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"Just in case"

On behalf of the general audience, I have replaced the misleading and confusing expression "just in case", with its correct, and easily understood equivalent, "if, and only if" (also, in more technical writing, "if and only if"). The following explains the error:

• Language Log: "Just in Case"
• Southern California Philosophy for philosophy graduate students: "Just in Case".Dr Lindsay B Yeates (talk) 21:19, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

I don't object to the change as the phrases are equivalent and either will serve equally well, but it's a bit much to call use of "just in case" an error. The phrase is an abbreviation either way it's used and both makes perfect sense given its context: "I'll take an umbrella just (i.e. only) [to be prepared] in [the] case [that] it rains", and "A man is a bachelor just (i.e. only) in [the] case [that] he is unmarried" both make perfect sense and are both sensibly abbreviated to "just in case". Fuss about the latter sense is much ado about nothing, and if anything, the former is a less literal reading as more assumed information needs to be read into it to arrive at that sense. --Pfhorrest (talk) 00:02, 10 April 2014 (UTC)